Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
History Faculty Articles and Research

History

7-2013

Review of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real
American War in Vietnam
Gregory A. Daddis
Chapman University, daddis@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/history_articles
Part of the Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, Diplomatic History
Commons, Military History Commons, Other History Commons, Political History Commons,
Public History Commons, Social History Commons, and the United States History Commons
Recommended Citation
Daddis, Gregory A. Review of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam, by Nick Turse. Journal of Military History
77, no. 3 ( July 2013): 1174-1176.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Review of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam
Comments

This review was originally published in Journal of Military History, volume 77, issue 3, in 2013.
Copyright

Society for Military History

This book review is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/history_articles/60

Book Reviews

Book Reviews

pe1rsonn1el in the same chain of command.
this achievement the
substantive returns on this investment were not sufficient to bring victory' and
remain open to question today.
For the rest of his public service, essentially a four-year stint in Harold Brown's
Department of Defense, Komer dealt with major problems in the same way he had
in Vietnam. Working on NATO questions as Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense, and then on the Middle East and on Central Asia problems as Undersecretary for Policy, he met with generally positive but often mixed results.
In the
out of office and never to return, Komer reflected once more
on the Vietnam
concluding that the best approach to winning would have
been to sooner and with more resources apply his nation-building, winning-thehearts-and-minds, pacification/counterinsurgency approach. Komer also faced the
question of
the United States failed to win. The reasons were many on both
the American and South Vietnamese sides but the heart of the matter, Jones tells
us, was the weakness of the American ally, South Vietnam--a nation led by vacilpoliticians and incompetent generals and, because it had time to be no other,
a political construct without roots or organic life.
Though Jones mentions it he does not emphasize the possible deleterious
impact of Komer's personality on his work. Nicknamed "Blowtorch Bob," Komer,
throughout his years of public service, exhibited to one and all administrative abrasiveness and intellectual arrogance, characteristics typical of what might be called
the difficult person syndrome. Simply put, the difficult person, although smart and
Ca.J_•~Hc...,u, achieves less than expected, or achieves nothing at all, because his or her
above mentioned qualities have offended the very people whose cooperation or
assistance is crucial for achievement. (Other examples might be James Schlesinger
at Defense, Richard Holbrooke at State, and Susan Rice at the United Nations.)
The above notwithstanding, Jones has succeeded in the task he set himsel£
We now know that Komer, not just during the Vietnam War but later in Carter's
LJ(~pa.rtr11e11t of Defense, acted as very few had - as a master strategist who understood the national interest and how to develop means to achieve it within the limits
of resources and reality. To convey this sophisticated, complex story to readers is no
mean feat and Jones has done it admirably.
Carland

Annandale, Virginia

Kil/Anything That Moves: The RealAmerican Jf.ilrin Vietnam. By NickTurse. New
York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt Co., 2013. ISBN 978-0-8050-8691-1.
Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. 370. $35.00.
In the Vietnam War constructed by investigative journalist Nick Turse, nearly
every American soldier was a remorseless killing machine wielding unlimited :firepower against a hapless civilian population. Violence, murder, and civilian suffering
were the norm, war crimes a natural outgrowth of US command policies. In short,
1174

*

THE JOURNAL OF

this work puts the carnage of war center stage. T urse has done valuable service in
his readers to consider violence against noncombatants in
while
challenging postwar narratives which portray atrocities like the
Lai massacre as
an aberration. For its subject matter alone, this is a taxing read.
Relying on the records of the Army's Vietnam War Crimes Working Group,
and supplementing his research with interviews of US veterans and Vietnamese
Turse aims to demonstrate how atrocities became routine for Americans
fighting in Vietnam. A constant emphasis on body counts permitted young soldiers
to unleash destructive impulses far beyond the scope of
behavior. T urse
thus moves from one brutality to the next in workmanlike fashion-the killing of
unarmed civilians, the burning of hamlets, the sexual exploitation of women, and
the purposeful generation of refugees. So debased had Americans become that
"Gang rapes were a horrifyingly common occurrence" (p. 168). Worse, U.S. officials
at the highest levels suppressed evidence of these atrocities to combat allegations
that criminality had become the norm.
Qyestioning the conduct of armies in war is a legitimate endeavor, as is
focusing one's historical lens on the civilian population. Too many American
accounts of Vietnam lose sight of the very object of a "people's war." In hoping
correct this error, Turse underscores the unnerving state of existence in which
local villagers faced unpredictable foreigners armed with modern, lethal weapons.
"At every turn, the onus was put on Vietnamese civilians to actively demonstrate
that they were indeed noncombatants" (p. 55). For a population Americans were
supposed to be protecting, such relationships clearly worked against larger US
goals in South Vietnam.
Unfortunately, Turse's laudable aim of bringing civilian anguish to the fore is
undermined by significant methodological shortcomings. The author loses sight of
the political and military context of the war, likely because of his single-minded
exploitation of the War Crimes Working Group files. Turse highlights American
transgressions in Binh Dinh province, for instance, without acknowledging its role
as a revolutionary stronghold. This is not meant to excuse atrocities but the reader
is left without any understanding of why US forces were conducting operations in
Binh Dinh or the difficulties posed by an elusive, intelligent, and equally violent
enemy. In this story, the Vietnamese are little more than victims. Moreover, Turse
evaluates none of the vital non-military programs and neglects the role of those
Americans involved in civic action. Even if violence eroded their moral principles,
not all soldiers were involved in "industrial-scale slaughter" (p. 204).
Turse's accounting thus raises questions about using a narrow body of evidence
to make broader generalizations about one of America's longest wars. While he
substantiates the horrific acts performed by some US soldiers and marines, Turse
sees in his research acts representative of American behavior writ large. Discounted
are the voices of countless Americans who genuinely believed-based on experience and doctrine-that protecting the population offered the surest path to a
stable, independent South Vietnam.
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Civilian
is a serious and most
understudied aspect of the
Vietnam War that merits discussion. We should do so in a way, however, that values
the Vietnamese population as more than just "collateral damage," while at the same
time allowing for the possibility that not all American soldiers were bent on laying
waste to the South Vietnamese countryside and its people.
Gregory A. Daddis

U.S. Military Academy
West Point, New York

